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OnWitness-discernibility of Elementary Particles
Øystein Linnebo1 & F.A. Muller2
Abstract In the context of discussions about the nature of ‘identical particles’ and the
status of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Quantum Mechanics, a
novel kind of physical discernibility has recently been proposed, which we call witness-
discernibility. We inquire into how witness-discernibility relates to known kinds of discer-
nibility. Our conclusion will be that for a wide variety of cases, including the intended
quantum-mechanical ones, witness-discernibility collapses extensionally to absolute discer-
nibility, that is, to discernibility by properties.
1 Introduction
There is a well-entrenched judgement in physics and in philosophy of physics that ac-
cording to Quantum Mechanics (QM), physical systems composed of ‘identical particles’
consist of indiscernible objects, and therefore violate Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity
of Indiscernibles (PII); see French & Krause (2008) and references therein. This judge-
ment has recently been scrutinised, criticised and discussed in a sequence of papers, e.g.
Saunders (2003), (2006), Muller & Saunders (2008), Muller & Seevinck (2009), Jantzen
(2011), Arenhart (2012), Caulton & Butterfield (2012). The critical argument essentially
is that not just properties but also relations can discern objects, and the accompanying
constructive argument is that in QM physically significant relations can be found that
demonstrably discern particles. Recently Ladyman & Bigaj (2010) have criticised the con-
structive argument by challenging the philosophical relevance of the employed notions
of relational discernibility in the demonstrations; they propose an alternative notion of re-
lational discernibility which does not always discern the particles, and which, they argue,
is better motivated philosophically. The purpose of this brief paper is to establish that in
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a wide variety of cases, the intended ones concerning QM included, Ladyman & Bigaj’s
proposed new kind of relational discernibility collapses to the old notion of discernibility
by properties.
In order to explain Ladyman & Bigaj’s proposal and to facilitate the demonstrations of
our results, we quickly rehearse some salient terminology. We consider a physical system
composed of elementary particles that share all their physical properties, such as mass,
electric charge, spin, etc.— the so-called super-selected physical magnitudes. Two particles
of a composite system that differ with regard to at least one of their physical properties
are called absolutely discernible. We express QM in some 1st-order language (L), that has
particle-variables: u, v, w, x, y, z (and labelled versions). Common practice in QM is to
label particles when considering an N-particle system; then L is enriched with N names
(1, 2, 3, . . ., N) and we speak of L∗. We can express absolute discernibility in L (and L∗)
by the following schema: particles a and b are absolutely discernible in QM iff (if and only
if) there is a monadic open sentence φ(·) in L (i.e. a formula in the logician’s sense, with a
single free variable) that holds in QM for a and not for b:
φ(a) ∧ ¬φ(b) . (1)
(The asymmetry of our definition is apparent only, because the roles of a and b can be
reversed by replacing φ(·) with ¬φ(·).) Particle b is an individual iff it is absolutely dis-
cernible from all other particles; its ‘individuality’ then is expressed by the sentence in
L that holds only for it. Particles a and b are relationally discernible in QM iff there is a
polyadic open sentence ρ(·, . . . , ·) in L such that:
∃ x1, . . . ,∃ xn : ¬
(
ρ(a, x1, . . . , xn)←→ ρ(b, x1, . . . , xn)
)
. (2)
Particle a is a relational iff it is relationally but not absolutely discernible from all other
particles; and a is indiscernible iff there are other particles from which a is neither abso-
lutely nor relationally discernible. In the current context, PII says that, if particles a and b
are indiscernible, then a = b. If PII holds in QM, then it is a QM-impossibility for there to
be indiscernible particles; so if there are indiscernibles in some model of QM, then PII is
in conflict with QM.
Quine (1976) demonstrated, against a background of 1st-order classical logic, that
there are two main kinds of relational discernibility. Two objects a and b are said to be rel-
atively discernible iff there is a formula σ(·, ·) such that σ(a, b) but not σ(b, a). Next, a and
b are weakly discernible iff there is a formula σ(·, ·) such that σ(a, b) but not σ(a, a). Both
absolute and relative discernibiliy imply weak discernibility — for the afore-mentioned,
let σ(a, b) be the formula displayed in (1) —, but the converse implications fail.
We now say that u and v are physically discernible (in either of the above senses) iff
the discerning sentence is physically significant. What makes a sentence in L physically
significant? Muller & Saunders (2008) answer generally by imposing two requirements:
(Req1) it is defined in terms of physical magnitudes (spin, energy, position, momentum,
&c.); and (Req2) it respects the symmetries of the theory, which is in the case of QM
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permutation and (Galilean) symmetry. The Symmetrisation Postulate of QM applies to
physical systems consisting of particles that are not absolutely discernible. Only relational
discernibility then is permitted by QM. Req2 imposes a further restriction: only weak re-
lational discernibility is permitted by QM, because the only permutation-invariant binary
relations are symmetric ones. Muller & Saunders (2008) demonstrate that inQM, fermions
are weakly discernible bymeans of relations, some of which can be interpreted in terms of
spin (thereby meeting the two Requirements); andMuller & Seevinck (2008) demonstrate
that inQM, all elementary particles, fermions and bosons included, are weakly discernible
by means of the canonical commutator relation, which is a symmetric relation defined in
terms of linear momentum and position (thereby meeting the two Requirements).
Ladyman & Bigaj (2010) adhere to the above terminology. They judge physical weak
discernibility however too weak to qualify as an acceptable concept of physical discer-
nibility, because it fails to say which particle is which. Ladyman & Bigaj then write (2010:
128–9; our emphasis):
This is not to say that the entire category of relational discernibility has to be rejected as
nonphysical and that the only admissible discernibility is the absolute one. Let us make
this clear by considering a perfectly acceptable case of relational discernibility not reducible
to the absolute one. [. . .] [W]e should make sure that there is a proper physical procedure
that could in principle identify those objects as distinct from the remainder of the universe
that does not discern them. Hence, we suggest that a corrected version of the condition of
relational discernibility should look something like that:
a and b are relationally physically discernible in L iff there is some physically
defined relation R such that ∃ x[(Rax ∧¬Rbx) ∧ ∀ y(y Ind x → (Ray ∧ ¬Rby))],
where ‘y Ind x’ means that y is absolutely physically indiscernible from x.
This passage makes it clear that their goal is to articulate a new kind of relational discernibi-
lity which is better motivated philosophically than the standard notion of weak discer-
nibility, yet is not extensionally equivalent to (or ‘reducible to’, as Ladyman & Bigaj put it)
absolute discernibility, or to any of the other mentioned kinds of discernibility mentioned
above. A somewhat similar idea was advanced by Dieks & Versteegh (2008: 933), who
call witness x a ‘gauge system’; they argue against the appeal to such a ‘gauge system’
in order to discern particles that are not absolutely discernible, in terms of expectation-
values, but they do not propose a definition of a new kind of discernibility to make this
idea explicit.
We claim that witness-discernibility turns out not to be a novel discernibility category
that differs extensionally from existing kinds. In Section 2, we show that, for a wide va-
riety of cases, witness-discernibility coincides extensionally with absolute discernibility.
In the final Section 3, we draw conclusions and take a walk on an avenue of escape for
proponents of witness-discernibility. The only option left that might be viable, we argue,
is to locate the value of the notion of witness-discernibility wholly at the intensional level,
as a new and interesting route to a well known relation-in-extension.
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2 Equivalence Theorems
We now wish to establish some general logico-mathematical results whose validity is
not limited to QM. So we work in the general setting provided by 1st-order logic and its
model theory (for more examples of this approach, see Ladyman, Linnebo, and Pettigrew
(2012)).
Consider a 1st-order languageLwith a modelM. Let a and b be objects in the domain
ofM: a, b ∈ dom(M).
Definition 1 (a) Objects a and b are absolutely discernible inM iff there is a monadic open
sentence φ(·) in L that is satisfied by a but not by b: M |= φ(a) ∧ ¬φ(b).
(b) Objects a and b are witness-discernible inM iff there is a dyadic open sentence ψ(·, ·)
in L and an object c ∈ dom(M), which we call a witness, such that:
(i) M |= ψ(a, c) ∧ ¬ψ(b, c), and
(ii) For any d ∈ dom(M) not absolutely discernible inM from c: M |= ψ(a, d) ∧ ¬ψ(b, d).
We believe our talk about there being a dyadic open sentence ψ(x, y) in L to be a reason-
able explication of Ladyman & Bigaj’s talk about a “physically defined relation R” (129).
Moreover, we observe that clause (i) is in fact redundant, as it follows from clause (ii) and
the observation that c is not absolutely discernible from itself: choose c for d in (ii) and (i)
obtains.
Since we already defined what absolute discernibility is in Section 1, have we not de-
fined it twice over? In fact, two subtly different notions have been defined. In Section 1,
we have defined absolute discernibility simpliciter, whereas we have now defined abso-
lute discernibility in a model. The afore-mentioned notion corresponds to a special case of
the last-mentioned where the model is chosen to represent the actual world. (Similarly,
truth simpliciter corresponds to truth in a model representing the actual world.)
We now proceed to some theorems that relate the notions of witness-discernibility
and absolute discernibility under various conditions. No conditions are present in the
first theorem.
Theorem 1 In every model M of L, any two elements in dom(M) that are absolutely dis-
cernible are also witness-discernible.
Proof. Suppose a and b are absolutely discernible by monadic open sentence ρ of L:
M |= ρ(a) ∧ ¬ρ(b) . (3)
To show that a and b are also witness-discernible, we must find a dyadic open sentence
of L, say ψ(·, ·), such that there is some c ∈ dom(M) such that for any d ∈ dom(M) that
is not absolutely discernible from c inM:
M |= ψ(a, d) ∧ ¬ψ(b, d) . (4)
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One easily verifies that, due to (3), the following sentence qualifies:
ρ(x) ∨
(
ϕ(y) ∨ ¬ϕ(y)
)
, (5)
where ϕ(·) is any monadic open sentence. Q.e.d.
Theorem 2 Whenever L allows infinite conjunctions, any two objects are absolutely discernible
in modelM of L iff they are witness-discernible inM.
Proof. The sufficiency of absolute discerniblity for witness discernibility follows from
Theorem 1, which holds for any languageL, including infinitary ones. Next the necessity.
Premise: a and b are witness-discernible inM with witness c and ψ(·, ·) as in Defini-
tion 1. Let Φ(x) be the conjunction of open sentences φ(x) such thatM |= φ(c):
∧
M|= φ(c)
φ(x) .
Note that M |= Φ(d) iff c and d are not absolute discernible. Let χ(x) be the following
sentence:
∃ y
(
Φ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y)
)
. (6)
Then we have M |= χ(a), because c serves as a witness to the existence claim. But we
cannot haveM |= χ(b); for if we did, thenM would contain an object d, not absolutely
discernible from c, such thatM |= ψ(b, d), in violation of clause (ii) of Definition 1 (b) of
witness-discernibility. ThusM 6|= χ(b) andM |= χ(a), which is to say that χ absolutely
discerns a and b inM. Q.e.d.
Theorem 3 If the domain ofM is finite, then any two elements are absolutely discernible inM
iff they are witness-discernible.
Proof. By Theorem 1, absolute discernibility is sufficient for witness-discernibility in gen-
eral and thus a fortiori in models with finite domains.
Now for the necessity. Since the domain is finite, we may assume that L is finitary;
no new expressive power would be gained by allowing infinite conjunctions. Choose
some enumeration {φj(x) | j ∈ ω} of the sentences of L with x as the only free variable.
We want a sentence ψ(x) such that M |= ψ(d) iff c and d are not absolute discernible.
Consider finitary approximations Φn(x) of the infinite conjunction Φ(x) used in the proof
of Theorem 2, defined as:
∧
M|= φj(c), 06j6n
φj(x) .
We claim that there is an n such that Φn(x) and Φ(x) have the same extension (•). If
so, then Φn(x) can be used instead of Φ(x) in the proof of Theorem 2, and we are done.
Assume, for reductio, that claim (•) fails. Then the Φn(x)would form an infinite sequence
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of sentences whose extensions get strictly less inclusive for arbitrarily large n. But this
cannot happen in a finite domain. So claim (•) stands. Q.e.d.
Theorem 3 raises the question whether witness-discernibility and absolute discernibi-
lity come apart in infinite models. By Theorem 1, in any model, two absolute discernible
objects are witness-discernible. The next Theorem refutes the converse in denumerably
infinite domains.
Theorem 4 When L is finitary, and specifically does not permit infinite conjunctions, then there
are models with a denumerably infinite domain that contains objects that are witness-discernible
but not absolute discernible.
Proof. Let L be a language with just two primitive predicates: S(x, y) (for ‘x sees y’) and
T(x, y) (for ‘x touches y’). Let Cn(x), for n > 1, abbreviate:
∃ x1, ∃ x2, . . . , ∃ xn : T(x, x1) ∧ T(x1, x2) ∧ . . . ∧ T(xn−1, xn) ; (7)
that is, that x participates in a chain of at least n objects (possibly with repetitions) each
of which touches the next. We now describe a denumerably infinite model Mω of L.
Dom(Mω) contains two objects, which we call Castor and Pollux, that are not absolutely
discernible. For every n, both can see an object, call it cn ∈ dom(Mω), that is the initial
member of a finite chain, of exactly n objects, each of which touches the next:
Mω |= Cn(cn) ∧ S(Castor, cn) ∧ S(Pollux, cn) . (8)
But only Castor can see an object, c ∈ dom(Mω), that is the initial member of a chain of
a denumerable infinity of objects, each of which touches the next:
Mω |= S(Castor, c) ∧ ¬S(Pollux, c) . (9)
There are no other objects in the domain, and no other relations obtain.
We claim that inMω, Castor and Pollux are witness-discernible. Clearly (9) is clause
(i) of witness-discernibility. In order to verify clause (ii), it suffices to verify that object
c is absolutely discernible from every other object of dom(Mω). Let d ∈ dom(Mω) be
distinct from c. Then there is some m such that d is not an initial member of a chain of
at least m objects each of which touches the next. This ensures that there is a monadic
sentence that distinguishes c from d, which makes c and d absolutely discernible.
It remains to show that Castor and Pollux are not absolutely discernible inMω. This
is easily proved by induction on the complexity of sentences of L, bearing in mind that L
is finitary and so does not permit infinite conjunctions. Q.e.d.
In (textbooks and papers on) QM, particles are labelled as a matter of course when consid-
ering physical systems composed of particles that are not absolutely discernible. Hence
let us extend L with names, resulting in L∗, which has a name for each element of
6
dom(M) — 1, 2, 3, . . . (N). In models of QM, the number of particles is finite. Logi-
cally we can consider a denumerably infinite number of particles, in which case L∗ has a
denumerably infinity of names.
Theorem 5 In every model M∗ of L∗, any two elements in dom(M∗) are witness-discernible
iff they are absolutely discernible.
Proof. The sufficiency of absolute discernibility for witness-discernibility follows from
Theorem 1, which holds for every language, including ones with names. We turn to the
necessity.
Premise: 1 and 2 are witness-discernible in model M∗. Then we have some dyadic
open sentence, say ψ(·, ·), such that there is some c ∈ dom(M∗), which has a name in L∗:
call it c, such that for any d ∈ dom(M∗), which also has a name (d), if d is not absolutely
discernible from c inM∗, then:
M∗ |= ψ(1, d) ∧ ¬ψ(2, d) . (10)
To show that 1 and 2 are also absolutely discernible inM∗, we must find a monadic open
sentence, say ρ(·), such thatM |= ρ(1 ) ∧ ¬ρ(2 ). One easily verifies that this is such a
sentence (having free variable x):
ψ(x, c) ∧ ¬ψ(2, c) . (11)
Q.e.d.
Notice that without names, this proof is no good: sentence (11) would be an open sen-
tence having three variables rather than one.
Theorem 5 is in harmony with a result of Ladyman, Linnebo, & Pettigrew (2012) that,
inL∗, weak discernibility entails absolute discernibility. For we also know that in any lan-
guage, absolute discernibility implies witness-discernibility, which in turn implies weak
discernibility (Section 1). By closing the loop, it follows that the four forms of discer-
nibility in L∗ (weak, relative, witness-discernibility and absolute) are extensionally equi-
valent.
3 Discussion and Conclusions
Our theorems show that witness-discernibility collapses to absolute discernibility in most
cases of interest.
By Theorem 3, one assumption sufficient for this collapse is that the domain is finite.
This is physically very encompassing, because physical theories describing composite
physical systems consisting of particles that are not absolutely discernible always consist
of a finite number of particles. Ladyman & Bigaj (2010: 124) also call a finite domain
“a plausible assumption for physical objects”. Systems of a denumerable infinitude of
particles have been considered, but rarely, and they arguably are not instantiated in our
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physical universe. (Fields instantiate an infinitude of degrees of freedom; fields, classical
and quantum, are absolutely discernible and therefore discernible in all other ways.) By
Theorem 4, the only case where absolute discernibility and witness-discernibility may
come apart, in that we have witness-discernible objects that are not absolutely discernible,
is where we have infinitely many objects. Another case of physical interest is space-time,
where we have, on a substantivalist reading, a non-denumerable infinitude of objects (i.e.
space-time points). Perhaps in such cases the mentioned notions also come apart. We
have no theorems to report on this issue, but we do want to point out the following.
In symmetric space-times of the General Theory of Relativity, all points in a 3-dimensional
hypersurface (a leaf of the foliation of space-time) are weakly but not absolutely dis-
cernible, which implies that PII holds (see Muller (2011)). But these points are notwitness-
discernible (as a moment’s reflection will reveal), so that if weakly discerning relations do
not really discern, as Ladyman & Bigaj maintain, and have to be replaced with witness
discerning relations in the sufficient condition for identity (PII), then PII will entail the
absurd conclusion that there is only a single space-time point in a 3-dimensional hyper-
surface. Thus, if PII is formulated in terms of witness-discernibility, its validity will be
more restricted than one would have thought.
By Theorem 2, another sufficient condition for the collapse of witness-discernibility
to absolute discernibility is that the language contains infinite conjunctions. In the event
that we want to consider infinitely many objects, it seems plausible to allow for infinite
conjunctions in one’s definitions of physical properties and relations.
By Theorem 1, without any restrictions on the size of the domain or on whether L
is finitary or infinitary, absolutely discernible objects always are also witness-discernible.
By Theorem 5, the converse also holds provided the objects in the model bear names,
such as when particles are labelled — which thus is another sufficient condition for the
mentioned collapse.
Let us finally consider whether the case for witness-discernibility can be improved by
modifying the definition of the new form of relational discernibility by requiring that the
witness be distinct from each of the two objects to be discerned. Ladyman & Bigaj write
in the displayed quotation in Section 1 that “there is a proper physical procedure that
could in principle identify those objects as distinct from the remainder of the universe that
does not discern them.” Clearly the remainder of the universe is what remains when we
have set the candidate objects for discerning apart. The witnessing object c belongs to
that remainder, so that one must have that a 6= c 6= b. To express this, we need to work
in a language with an identity predicate. Let L= be such a language. Then we define that
a and b are witness+-discernible in modelM of L= iff there is an open sentence ψ(x, y) in L
and an object c ∈ dom(M) such that:
(i) M |= ψ(a, c) ∧ ¬ψ(b, c) ∧ a 6= c 6= b, and
(ii) for any d ∈ dom(M) not absolutely discernible inM from c and distinct from a and
b,
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we have: M |= ψ(a, d) ∧ ¬ψ(b, d).
However, this modification provides no solace for defenders of witness-discernibility. For
we easily see that, for any modelM and language with identity L=, absolute discernibi-
lity entails witness+-discernibility, which in turn entails witness-discernibility. But we
have identified physically plausible conditions under which witness-discernibility en-
tails absolute discernibility. By completing the circle of entailments, it follows that, under
these conditions, witness+-discernibility too collapses to absolute discernibility.
Theorem 5 employs names, in opposition to the prohibition of names by Ladyman &
Bigaj (2010: 124). The motivation to forbid names is that they permit us to discern the
particles by using no more than the fact that they bear names: that is too cheap. We agree.
What we like to point out however is that forbidding names is a kill or cure remedy. How
to state the Symmetrisation Postulate of QM without labelling the particles? Here names
are employed to express a crucial assumption of QM about physical systems consisting of
particles that are not absolutely discernible. There is nothing against labelling (naming)
the particles; specifically, there is nothing against expressing physically significant propo-
sitions by using names, e.g. the Symmetrisation Postulate. What happens in the proof of
Theorem 5 is that we begin by assuming that particles 1 and 2 are witness-discernible,
and then show they are also absolutely discernible by defining a monadic predicate that
is defined in terms of the witness discerning dyadic predicate: if the last-mentioned is
physically significant, then so is the afore-mentioned. The use of names does not obliter-
ate the physical significance of a proposition. Their presence in the proof of Theorem 5 is
unobjectionable.
We conclude that witness-discernibility is extensionally equivalent to absolute discer-
nibility on each of a number of plausible assumptions; notably, in the case of N-particle
systems in QM, the case of interest, the collapse is guaranteed. Any philosophical inter-
est of the notion of witness-discernibility would thus have to lie at the intensional level.
(This is how Ladyman & Bigaj (2011) wish to respond.) For even in cases of extensional
equivalence with absolute discernibility, it cannot be denied that witness-discernibility
provides a new route to what turns out to be a well known relation-in-extension; an unex-
pected meaning can indeed be ascribed to ‘absolute discernibility’. We leave for others to
assess the philosophical value of this new intensional route to a familiar extension.
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